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Dans la NTV, Berkeley assimile la vision à un langage que Dieu parle aux hommes et, 
parallèlement, dans les Principes, il rapproche les méthodes de la nature d’un langage divin. 
Mon papier est une étude des caractéristiques de la notion de langage telle que Berkeley 
l’utilise dans ces deux contextes et de la portée des deux analogies.  Je me demanderai donc 
si la notion de langage utilisée dans les Principes est la même que celle de la NTV et surtout 
si la Nature des Principes est un langage de la même manière que la vision est un langage 
dans la NTV. Je crois que la comparaison entre les deux textes sur la question du langage 
permet de découvrir les liens théoriques effectifs existant entre les deux textes. 
 
Summary 
In his New Theory of Vision, Berkeley compares vision to a language in which God speaks to 
mankind. In an apparently similar way, in the Principles Berkeley compares the methods of 
Nature to a divine language. The present paper is a study of the features of the notion of 
language used by Berkeley in these two contexts and of the purport of the two analogies. One 
of the questions explored is whether the notion of language in the Principles is the same as in 
New Theory of Vision, and more particularly whether Nature, in the Principles, is conceived 
as a language in the same manner as vision in the New Theory of Vision. I will try to show 
that the comparison between the two texts on the question of divine language enables us to 
discover their theoretical relationship. 
 
 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a model that might be called 
semiotic was employed to account for various aspects of nature and of 
perception. According to this model, natural phenomena and perceptions are 
connected to their causes in virtue of a constant relation which does not 
necessarily imply a resemblance between the sign and its meaning. 
 
In the New Theory of Vision1, Berkeley claims that visual ideas constitute a 
language in the proper sense of the term and that this language is the language 
that God speaks to men. With this thesis of a divine optical language, Berkeley 
                                                 
1 G. Berkeley, An essay toward a New Theory of Vision, in The Works of George Berkeley 
Bishop of Cloyne (Ed. by A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop), Nelden, Kraus Reprint, 1979, vol. 1, 
hereafter abbreviated to  as NTV, followed by  section number. 
transforms the general semiotic model into a linguistic one. In the philosophy of 
Berkeley the idea of language plays a particularly important role, as it is not just 
limited to being an explanatory model, but is additionally used as a key idea for 
explaining visual perception and for offering proofs of the existence of God in 
NTV and Alciphron. 
 
The notion of language used by Berkeley in his proof of the divine visual 
language is relatively complex because he specifies not only the features of the 
relation between visual signs and their tactual significations, but equally the 
ways or rules according to which a limited number of signs may combine in 
order to give rise to a potentially infinite number of new meanings. 
 
In this paper I want to demonstrate the links that exist between Principles of 
Human Nature and NTV on the topic of language. More particularly I want to 
show that Berkeley tries to strengthen the arguments of PHK for the existence 
of God by means of the NTV’s thesis that vision is a language. The relations 
between NTV and PHK therefore do not play themselves out at the level of the 
theory of abstraction, but rather at that of visual language. 
 
First of all I will deal with language as it is presented in NTV, then with 
language in the first and second editions of PHK, and finally with the relations 
between these texts. 
 
Berkeley defines the force, use and nature of language in the fourth dialogue of 
Alciphron as follows: 
 
[…] the arbitrary use of sensible signs, which have no similitude 
or necessary connexion with the things signified; so as by the 
apposite management of them suggest and exhibit to my mind an 
endless variety of things, differing in nature, time and place; 
thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to 
act, not only with regard to things near and present, but also with 
regard to things distant and future. […]2 
 
Two characteristics therefore seem to be essential if a thing is to be a language: 
first there must be a system of signs linked to their significations neither by 
necessity nor resemblance; further, it is necessary that the arrangement and the 
                                                 
2 Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, in Works, op. cit., vol. 3; IV, 7; hereafter abbreviated 
to  A, followed by dialogue and section number.  
organisation of the signs amongst and between themselves should be such that 
their significations could be multiplied infinitely. The first aspect has to do with 
the foundation of the relation between sign and signification, whilst the second 
concerns the manner of combining signs in order to achieve new significations. 
In the PHK and TVV, Berkeley specifies that the arrangement of signs should 
be performed by rules and with wise contrivance (cf. TVV and PHK). 
 
In the NTV, Berkeley shows that we do not immediately see the distance, size 
etc., of objects, but that there are ideas immediately perceived by the sight 
which, by virtue of an association learnt by experience, function as the signs of 
corresponding tactile ideas. These idea-signs can establish a rule as they admit 
of degrees. Thus when, for example, the spirit has experienced a ‘habitual 
connection between the several degrees of confusion and distance; the greater 
confusion still implying the lesser distance, and the lesser confusion the greater 
distance of the object’, the different degrees of confusion of a visible image 
have come to signify different degrees of distance, a greater confusion 
indicating a lesser distance and vice versa. Another ‘gradual’ sign of distance is 
found in the variable disposition of the eyes. 
 
Discussing the case of  faintness in an image of the moon produced by the 
interposition of an opaque screen, which, despite the increased faintness of the 
visual image does not modify at all the visible magnitude of the moon, Berkeley 
holds that the relation between the signs and significations of visual language 
function in exactly the same way as the relations of verbal language, as both the 
former and the latter depend on context, and it is only when taken in that 
context that the tangible signification is determined (NTV 73). 
 
The dependence on context, and the possibility of illusions as in the cases of 
mirrors or paintings, are confirmations of the contingency of the relation 
between the visible sign and its tactile signification. 
 
In Alciphron IV.12, Berkeley seems to intuit that the difference between 
visual signs and significations and the phenomena of nature is that 
visual signs, differing in this respect from natural phenomena, testify to 
the existence of a God ‘good and provident’, ‘actually and intimately 
present’, whereas natural phenomena or the laws of movement don’t 
testify to a spirit of this kind. 
 
I come now to the idea of language in the PHK, in order to show points of 
convergence and divergence in relation to the idea of language in NTV. 
 
In the PHK the reader is led to reflect on language, its use and structure in two 
places. First of all in the introduction, and then in sections 64-66 and 103-09 of 
the first part. 
 
In sections 65-66 Berkeley firstly affirms that the relation between natural 
phenomena need not be seen as a relation between causes and effects, but as a 
relation between signs and things signified. Secondly, Berkeley affirms that the 
regularity with which phenomena manifest themselves are established in order 
that an infinity of phenomena can be signified by a limited number of elements 
or signs, in the same way (as he explains) that in language a limited number of 
letters combined with one another can form an extremely large number of 
words. 
 
Section 104 introduces the theme of mechanical explanations of nature. 
Knowledge of phenomena, claims Berkeley (105, picking up on section 65), is 
nothing other than the discovery of regular relations (analogies) which allow us 
to infer what might take place at different moments in time and space. The 
problem is – says Berkeley (106) – that scientists have a tendency to overextend 
the application of rules found to apply in the case of certain natural phenomena, 
as in mechanist explanations of nature that describe attraction as a universal 
principle. Such explanations suggest that all phenomena embody one single 
variety of quantitative relations, illustrate a single rule and therefore – such 
scientists presume – a universal rule. 
 
However, Berkeley asserts that a close observation of phenomena such as the 
vertical growth of plants or the consistency of the relative position of the fixed 
stars obliges us to recognise that 1) attraction is not universal and that therefore 
2) the laws of movement described by them are not necessary, and 3) that they 
are rather the result of the free choice of a ‘governing Spirit’. The vertical 
growth of plants as well as the constant relation of the fixed stars are not simply 
the exceptions to a supposedly universal rule of attraction, but rather the 
incarnation of different rules (or principles) freely chosen by God. 
 
Berkeley’s progression from the plurality of rules to free choice and a 
‘governing spirit’ - as if  it were somehow difficult for there to be several blind 
mechanical principles which are applied mechanically to different kinds of 
objects - is quite surprising. Moreover, having recognised the existence of a 
‘governing spirit’, Berkeley announces the analogy according to which  
 
108. […] the steady and consistent Methods of Nature, may not 
unfitly be Styled the Language of its Author, whereby he 
discovers his Attributes to our View, and directs us how to act 
for the Convenience and Felicity of Life. […] 
 
The essence of Berkeley’s proposal remains the same in the second edition, 
when, retaining the sections on the non-universality of attraction, and the 
plurality of laws of natural movements (vertical growth of plants, elasticity of 
the air, etc), he no longer invokes the resemblance of the methods of nature to a 
book that may be observed (‘perusing’) in choosing to pay attention either 1. to 
the manner of reducing particular phenomena to general rules or 2. in delighting 
in the beauty of nature observed (section 109). Also, in section 108 of the 
second edition he corrects the phrase ‘this  language (if I may so call it) of the 
Author of Nature’ by substituting for it the following phrase: ‘those signs 
instituted by the Author of Nature’. I think that in the two editions of the PHK 
the comparison between the methods of nature and a divine language is 
metaphorical. This seems evident when one compares the expressions used by 
Berkeley to present the divine language thesis in PHK and NTV. In NTV 146 
(first edition), Berkeley writes: ‘Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude 
that the proper objects of vision constitute the universal language of nature’, 
whereas in PHK Berkeley uses forms of expression such as that the methods of 
nature ‘may be styled a language’ and ‘if I may so call it’. Thus, I think that the 
principal difference between the first and second editions here is the change 
from a language taken in the metaphorical sense, and a mere collection of signs. 
It is as if Berkeley had taken stock of the difficulty of incorporating the methods 
of nature into the linguistic model, and had chosen a less demanding model, that 
of a system of signs. 
 
I would like to suggest, then, that Berkeley is well aware that the proof of the 
existence of God founded on visual language is stronger than that of PHK, 
which I shall call an argument by design, or that, at the very least, they 
demonstrate the existence of spirits having different characteristics. Berkeley is 
explicit on this point in Alciphron. I think that his strategy consists in ensuring 
that the theory of a visual language of NTV is in a certain manner comprised 
within the philosophy of PHK. It is for this reason that he always mentions the 
thesis of a visual language in referring to the reading of NTV, as much in PHK 
as in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous and evidently in Alciphron; 
andhe gives a prominent place to visual phenomena even in Siris when he 
returns to the thesis of the language of the author of nature.  
 
To conclude I would like to defend two theses. The first is that the NTV was 
developed in a manner independent of the anti-materialist and anti-abstractionist 
theses of the PHK. The principle thesis of the NTV is that vision is a language 
God speaks to men and this thesis has no immediate implications for the 
existence of matter or for the possibility of abstract ideas. 
 
The second thesis which I have tried to defend is that the reference to a divine 
language is much weaker in the PHK that in NTV and that Berkeley tries to 
ensure that the theory of visual language of NTV is in a certain manner 
comprised in the philosophy of the PHK. 
